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lV

lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH-IDAHO SCHOOL SUPPLY
COMP ANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
UTAH STATE
BUILDING
BOARD and HERBERT :F. S:MART,
Director of Finance of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent,

Case No.
11395

AMERICAN DESK MANUF ACTURING COMP ANY,
Intervenor and Appellant.

Plaintiff and Respondent's Brief
NATURE OF THE CASE
This proceeding sought a declaratory judgment of
Utah law applicable to the bidding and letting of state
contracts for the acquisition of fixtures and equipment,
and particularly such contracts using "Campus Funds."
This suit was required after the Attorney General issued an opinion reversing the prior position of that
1

office and the long-standing procedures of the State
Building Board by holding the Board could not issue
a contract for 14,847 sea ts to be installed in the "Special
Events Arena" of the University of Utah to plaintiff,
who had bid $301,987.98 for one type of seat, and must
contract with intervenor, who had bid $296,049.00 for
a different seat, even though plaintiff's seat had been
determined to be superior in quality and its bid the
best bid by both the University Board of Regents and
the State Building Board.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
After a trial of the issues a declaratory judgment
was entered, which found that the Utah State Building
Board was authorized to exercise its judgment and discretion as to which of the types of seating that had
been bid was best suited for the intended purposes and
afforded the greatest value and utility, and that it had
properly accepted the recommendation of the U niversity' s Board of Regents and validly exercised its discretion and judgment in determining that the plaintiff's
bid was the best bid and that it was not bound to contract for the seating with the low bidder when a valid
difference in values had been determined.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This respondent urges the Supreme Court to affirm
the findings and declaratory judgment as entered by
the District Court.
2

STATEI\IENT OF FACTS
Intervenor's Statement of Facts is incomplete and
misleading, and it is therefore necessary to inform th>.:
court of the following additional facts:
The permanent seating to be furnished and installed in the "Special Events Arena" in the University
of Utah was bid separately from the general construction contract for the arena, under separate specifications
(R. 115, Exhibit P-1). The procedure followed by the
State of Utah for the acquisition of equipment and
supplies is to have the Department of Finance bid and
let the contracts unless there is labor or installation
charges involved, in which event the Department of
Finance calls for bids and then transmits the bids to
the State Building Board for the letting by it of the
contract (R. 109, 133). The specification used for this
seating was what is known as a modified base bid type
specification. This type specification is one in which
several items are specified and the owner then makes
the final determination as to which is superior. This is
distinguishable from what is known as a bidder's choice
type specification, wherein the specification contains
two or more brand names and the contractor has the
option of providing under the contract any of the products named. ( R. 128, 129, 130, 132). This type of
specification has been used by the Utah State Building
Board for a number of years in order to maintain control over the quality of items specified and bid (R. 134,
135).
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As indicated by the intervenor, the specifications
for the 14,847 seats to be furnished and installed designated by model and make four different types of seating. One of the four types was manufactured by the
intervenor and the other three by the plaintiff. Each of
these four types of seats had some different characteristics, as is indicated by the following brief descriptions:
Seat Type 1 was American Seating Chair No. 4210
(Exhibit P-1, page A/2). It was a bucket style seat of
single-wall plastic supported by a steel frame which
is affixed to a horizontal beam that is attached to a riser.
Seat Type 2 was the same identical Chair No. 4210
as Type 1, but with an additional attachment to the
under side of the seat known as "Accoustical Treatment." (Exhibit P-1, page Alo)
Seat Type 3, American Seating Chair No. 104, differed greatly in style from Types 1 and 2. It had a
separate seat and back of double wall plastic with cast
iron standards affixed directly to the riser rather than
to a beam, and also was the only chair specified with
plastic arms.
Seat Type 4, American Desk Series 2810 and 2910
Chair, while similar in style to Seat Type 3, had many
different qualities and characteristics, including aluminum standards rather than cast iron, and a seat and
back of single-wall plastic without any steel re-enforcement. Other differences between Type 3 and Type 4
are set forth in some detail in the minutes of the Board
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of Regents meeting of December 11, 1967 (R-26, :27).
(Also see July 10, 1967 letter from Director of University of Utah Planning and Construction to the Building Hoard.) ( R-35.)
The specifications contain a number of provisions
which expressly provided that the differing qualities of
the sea ts would be carefully inspected and examined
before the successful bidder was determined, and that
the bid price would not be solely determinative. Some
of these provisions of the specifications found in ExhiLit
P-1 are as follows:
Sec. 2....
4. . .. Detailed specifications have been written for various seats as manufactured by different
companies so that the Owner can evaluate the
actual seat (as submitted by sample) and its cost
and shall then select whatever seat deemed most
consistent with his interests, regardless of cost.
All bidders must indicate both unit and total
costs for their seats.
5. The owner reserves the right to reject any
or all proposals or any combination thereof, and
may waive any informalities.
(Page IB/l and 2)
9. The contract with the Utah State Building

Board will be awarded as soon as possible to any
responsible bidder and/ or bidders deemed most
desirable by the Owner regardless of price.
(Page IB/3)
Sec. 30. . ..
I. The Contractor's past jerformance, organization, equipment, and ability to perform
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and complete his contracts in th~ manner and
within the time limit specified will be vital elements, along with the case amount of the bid,
which will be considered by the Owner in the
letting of the contract.
(Page GC/9)
4. GENERAL REQUIRE~lENTS:

a. Each manufacturer shall submit a letter
to the Architect, listing three ( 3) major Arena's
that are using the seating he is offering. This
letter in addition to the name of Arena, must give
the location and the name of Arena and the name
and mailing address of the Manager of the
Arena, so that the Architect and Owner can obtain whatever information is deemed necessary.
Failuer to submit such a list, or upon verification
by Architect and Owner that the Arena listed is
not equipped with such chairs, shall be sufficient
cause for rejection of his bid.
b. Each manufacturer shall submit to the Department of Planning and Construction at the
University of Utah a sample of the exact riser
mounted two seat section that he will submit a
proposal for. Samples must be representative in
every detail to the item intended. Failure to
comply will constitute grounds for disqualification of the bid. Such samples shall be delivered
at no expense to the Owner five calendar days
prior to the bid opening date.
(Page All)
The specifications identified the "Owner," as that
term was used therein, as the State of Utah, as represented by the State Building Board.
Plaintiff submitted a bid on all three types of its
seats that were specified, and as intervenor has stated,
6

proposed two deductive alternatives with respect to the
'l'ype 3 seat. First a deduction of $0.51 per seat if the
plastic arms, which were only specified on this model
and not on the other three seats, were to be left off; and
second, a reduced price of $1.75 per seat if the self-riser
specified was eliminated ( R. 29) .
The bidding of the deductive alternates was in
keeping with the following provisions of the specifications (Exhibit P-1) .
Sec. 31, SUBSTITUTIONS:
1. Reference in the specifications to any ar-

ticle, device, product, material, fixture, form or
type of construction by name, make or catalog
number shall be interpreted as establishing a
standard of quality and shall not be construed as
limiting competition; and the Contractor, in such
cases, may at his option use any article, device,
product, material, fixture, form or type of construction which is equal to that specified.
2. Bidders may submit bids on nominated sub-

stitute items other than those noted in the accompanying specifications. Those Contractors
nominated substitutes, shall be submitted under
the following procedure:

(a) The Contractor nominating a substitute
must accompany his bids with full specifications,
catalogs, cuts, photographs, and samples of each
item and must be prepared upon request to demonstrate to the Owner and the Architect, that the
item bid is the equivalent of or superior to the
item described in the accompanying specifications.
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(b) The Contractor shall name the substitute
item, together with the amount to be added to or
deducted from his/their bid.
( c) The Owner and representatives of the
University and Architect, shall evaluate all proposals including items submitted as substitutions.
The Architect shall evaluate all submittals and
make recommendatio.as l.o the Owner following
consultation with representatives of the University of Utah. As to items to be purchased it
shall be understood by all bidders that a certain
intent is made in the preparation of these documents, and that seats not compatible to the style,
technical features and other evaluated items, may
not be recommended for purchase by the Owner.
The price quoted by the vendor is not necessarily
the only criteria to be eYaluated, and if the low
bid item is not of quality of other proposed items,
the Owner may elect to purchase such items on
the basis of the performance of these specif ications.
(Finding 6, R. 43)
The bidders, pursuant to the requirements of the
specifications, submitted samples along with their bids
of the types of seats that they bid upon together with
information concerning the locations of installations
using such seats. The Buildings and Grounds Committee of the University of Utah Board of Regents,
inspected and tested the seat samples and had engineers
from the University of Utah visit and inspect the installations where the various seats had been installed and
were in use (R. 102, 103). In addition, this Committee
held hearings where representatives of the competing
8

bidders explained the advantages and disadvantages of
their respective seats ( R. 94).
The Board of Regents, at its meeting of June 30,
1967, approved recommending to the Building Board
the acceptance of the plaintiff's bid on Seat Type 3,
leaving it up to the University administration whether
to exclude or include the self-rising feature (R. 25-26,
93) . This meeting preceded any controversy over the
bids. Subsequently, the Board of Regents considered
the matter at its meeting of December 11, 1967, after
the Attorney General's opinion. The minutes of that
meeting detailed the reasons that the Building and
Grounds Committee continued to believe that plaintiff's seat was superior, and contained another resolution
from the Board finding that the plaintiff's bid was the
lowest and best bid because the difference in price
between it and the intervenor's bid was more than off set
by the better quality of the plaintiff's seat ( R. 26). The
Board then resolved again to recommend to the Building Board that it purchase the Type 3 seat without the
alternate deductions for the total sum of $301,987.98.
This price exceeded intervenor's bid of $296,049.18 by
approximately 35 cents per seat.
Subsequent to the opening of the bids and the
determination by the Board of Regents at its June
meeting in 1967 that the plaintiff's Type 3 seat should
be acquired, with or without the self-risers, the plaintiff
wrote a letter to the University advising the University
that if it wanted to accept this type seat without the
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self-riser and later determined that it wished a selfriser installed, that this could be accomplished for the
same price per self-riser unit as bid for an improved
self-riser product (R. 36). Such a proposal was clearly
authorized and in keeping with the following provisions
of the specifications (Exhibit P-1) :
"Sec. 11. CHANGES IN THE WORK:
1. The Owner, without invalidating the contract, may order extra items or make changes
by altering, adding to, or deducting from the
specified items, the contract sum being adjusted
in accordance with the unit price submitted. All
such work shall be executed under the conditions
of the original contract, except that any claim
or extension of time caused thereby shall be adjusted at the time of authorization of such
change.
2. In giving instructions, the Architect shall
have the authority to make minor changes in the
work not involving extra cost, and not inconsistent with the Contract Documents and the purpose
of the building."
(Page GC/3)

The Building Board, upon receiving the recommendations of the University Board of Regents, made its
own independent investigation of the bids. It was preparing to issue a contract for the seating to the plaintiff
when intervenor's counsel by letter of July 18, 1967,
requested the Attorney General to intervene (Exhibit
P-6). The Attorney General by letter of the same date
directed the Director of the Building Board to stay any
final action until his office had completed an investiga-
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tion (Exhibit P-5). In the latter part of July, 19ti7, a
hearing was hdd before members of the 13uilding Board
staff, the Department of 1''inance, the University administration, and the Attorney General, at which representatives of both bidders presented samples of their
seats and arguments in favor of their particular product
(Exhibit P-8).
The Attorney General in a letter opinion dated
September 1, 1968, informed the Director of the Buil<ling Doard that it could not award the contract to the
plaintiff and should award the contract to the intervenor
in order to avoid incurring financial liability to the
intervenor ( R. 32-33).
In January of 1968 formal presentations, together
with sample products, were made by the bidders to all
members of the Building Board in formal session ( R.
117) .T he Board unanimously concluded that the plaintiff's bid was the best bid and that the difference in
price was more than offset by the better quality of
plaintiffs seat. Pursuant to the Board action, the Director advised the Department of Finance that the plaintiff's bid should be accepted and the contract awarded
to the Plaintiff (R. 24). The Department of Finance
responded that the contract would not be given to the
plaintiff as requested by both the Board of Regents
of the University and the State Building Board, because
of the Attorney General's letter of September 1, 1967
(R. 25).
The funds to be used by the State of Utah for the
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acquisition and installation of these seats, together with
the funds for the construction of the "Special Events
Center," came from the sale of student fee revenue bonds
(R. 82) issued pursuant to the authority of Chapter 38
of Title 53, U.S.A., 1953, as amended (R. 91). These
funds, known as "campus funds," are held in a trust
fund and disbursed pursuant to resolutions of the Board
of Regents of the University. (R. 82, 92, 116; Exhibit
P-2.)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DECLARING THAT UNDER APPLICABLE
UTAH STATUTES THE CONTRACTING
AUTHORITY IS GIVEN DISCRETION TO
CONSIDER Tl-IE QUALITY 01:1' THE PRODUCTS BID AS WELL AS THE BID PRICE.
Intervenor cites two statutes in now acknowledging
that the State Building Board has authority to let the
contract for the Arena seating, and urges that under
these statutes the Board must always contract with the
low bidder, no matter what compelling considerations
exist that such is not the best bid or in the public interest. Plaintiff asserted below that because "campus
funds" provide the capital to build and furnish the
Sports and Social Events Center, Section 53-38-5,
U.C.A. 1953, cited by appellant, is controlling. It is
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submitted, however, that this controlling section is not
restricted, as intervenor contends, by Section 63-10-'7,
so that the Building Board does not have the clear
authority given i~ by the express language of Section
53-38-5,

" . . . to make all contracts and execute all
instruments which in its discretion may be
deemed necessary or advisable to provide for the
acquisition, purchase, construction, furnishing
and equipment of the building and the acquisition of all necessary land therefor.... "
Neither of these two sections now relied upon by
the intervenor was mentioned, or apparently even considered, by the Attorney General in the letter opinion
procured by the intervenor and dated September 1,
1967 (R. 32-33). The Attorney General cited Sections
li4-l-5 and 63-2-29, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as
amended, as controlling, and erroneously indicated that
these sections required the awarding of a bid to the
lowest bidder who was financially responsible, and precluded the owner from determining which bid was most
consistent with its interests, regardless of cost, in accordance with the provisions of Item 4, Section 2 of
the Specification (Exhibit P-1, page IB/l).
The Attorney General's letter indicated that the
contract which the Board of Regents and Building
Board wished to enter into with the plaintiff may have
been "negotiated," and that this unfounded charge
may have influenced the opinion. Apparently this came
from in1 ~rvenor, who, on page 10 of its brief, implies
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that the Building Board had dickered and finagled with
the bidders. Suffice it to say that the sworn testimony
and uncontroverted evidence established that the bidding and all subsequent actions of the plaintiff were
proper and above reproach, and that both the Board of
Regents and the Building Board gave both bidders ar~
equal opportunity at several open hearings to present
their case before any final decision was made. Because
of intervenor's continued efforts to imply wrong-doing,
plaintiff felt obliged to set forth in detail the actual
facts of this transaction and designate as part of the
record the transcript of the testimony ( R. 61).
The Attorney General's letter recognized that Section 64-1-5 requires the contract to be let to "the lowest
responsible bidder," and that Section 63-2-29 requires
it to be let to "the responsible bidder making the lowest
and best bid." Apparently because the contract was
handled by the Building Board the Attorney General
stated: "'7\Thile this element does not affect our conclusion, it appears obvious that the seating contract
has been regarded by everyone as a contract to be administered in accordance with § 64-1-5." This particular
section covers the letting by the Building Board of
contracts for the repair or construction of state buildings. Section 63-2-29 authorizes the Director of Finance
to contract for various items, including equipment,
furniture, furnishings, office supplies, etc. The difference in language between these two section ("lowest
responsible bidder," "lowest alld best bid,") appears to
have originated because the former dealt with con-
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struction contracts in which numerous materials were
specified, along with required lab9r, with the contractor
submitting an over-all bid and choosing which of the
specified materials he would use, while in the acquisition of items of equipment, furnishings, office supplies,
etc., various specific items are available which are not
always equal in quality or performance, and thus a
specific evaluation by the owner of the items was
required.
In this case if "campus funds" had not been involved, and if there had been no installation of the
seating required by the bidder, then the seating would
have been obtained as furniture by the Department of
Finance under Section 63-2-29 (R. 109, 133). Because
"campus funds" were involved, the Building Board was
charged to handle the contract under Section 53-38-5.
It is, however, immaterial to a determination of this
case which of these four statutes is controlling, for
whether a legislative provision requires that a public
contract be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder,"
or the "lowest and best bidder," or to a similarly designated bidder, it is generally held that the awarding
officials may take into consideration the differences or
variations in the character or quality of the materials,
articles or work proposed to be furnished by the respective bidders in determining who should be awarded the
contract. See 27 A.L.R. 2d., 926 for a review of the
overwhelming authority of the courts which have faced
this question. See also 43 Am. Jur., 786, where the first
paragraph of Section 44 states:
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" ... Usually, however, as pointed out above,
the contract is not required to be awarded to the
lowest bidder, without qualification, but is to be
awarded to the 'lowest and best bidder,' etc., and
there is but little dissent from the general rule
that in determining who is such 'lowest responsible bidder,' 'lowest and best bidder,' etc., public
boards and officials are vested with wide discretion, and their decision, when based upon an
honest exercise of the discretion thus vested in
them, will not be interfered with by the courts,
even if erroneous. Under this rule, public authorities may exercise discretion as to quality of
material or workmanship, and its adaptability
to the particular use or purpose desired, and,
according to the weight of authority are allowecl
to make a choice between different kinds of materials, when, by the terms of the specifications,
competition, is open ~s to all kinds, provided, of
course, that the choice must be reasonable, and
not fraudulent or arbitrary. V\There contracts are
to be let on terms most advantageous to the state
or to the public, the discretion in making the
award is particularly broad, and will not be interfered with by the courts if exercised on a
rational basis, without fraud or palpable abuse."
Two Utah cases confirm the general principle that
in the expenditure of public funds the designated agency
has the responsibility to procure the best facility for the
money, and is not bound to the acceptance of a lowdollar bid. In passing, we note that these cases so held,
even in the absence of a statute, such as we have here,
stating that "discretion" should be utilized.
In Clayton v. Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 2d 57, 387
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P. 2d 93 ( l !:)IJJ) , the court affirmed the summary
judgment :for defendant in a suit by taxpayers to prohibit the acceptance of the next lowest bid for the
construction of the public safety and jail building. The
case might be distinguishable on the grounds that the
offer of the iowest bidder did not conform to the specifications. However, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that even if the variations by the lowest bidder were
permissable, it would not follow that the lowest bid
must be accepted. It stated, at page 59:
"Its (the joint authority) responsibility was to
accept that bid, which in its judgment would
provide the best possible facility for the money.
Inherent in the nature of its duties and its
presumed superior knowledge and expertise in
performing them, the public authority must
have a wide latitude in which to exercise its judgment as to the best means of accomplishing that
objective. The court is reluctant to interfere with
the administrative function and would do so only
if facts were shown to indicate dishonesty, fraud,
collusion or lack of good faith in performing the
duty mentioned. That is not demonstrated here.
"Accordingly it was within the prerogative of
the Joint Authority to accept the bid of Southern
Steel, even at a somewhat higher price, if it
thought, as it insists it did, that it would construct
a better facility and thus be the more prudent
use of public funds."
The court relied on Schulte v. Salt Lake City, 79
Utah 272, 10 P. 2d 625 (1932) in its decision. There
the plaintiff taxpayer challenged the award of a sewer
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construction contract by Salt Lake City to the next
to lowest bidder. The Court indicated that the statute
governing improvements made from the general funds
may not be applicable and even if it were, it does not
require letting to the lowest responsible bidder. Nonetheless, the court states at page 300, after citing the
general rule regarding the broad discretion of officers
of a city in letting contracts for public improvement, as
follows:
" ... A similar rule prevails in most jurisdictions under statutes which require that contracts
for public improvements be let to the lowest responsible bidder. In such case the officers whose
duty it is to award the contracts are vested with
discretion in determining who is the most responsible and best bidder. Responsibility is not, according to the weight of judicial authority,
confined to financial responsibility. It includes
the experience, skill, ability and honesty of the
bidders. Courts will not interfere with the decision of the city authorities in awarding a contract if such decision is founded upon such facts
that it is not a manifest abuse of discretion, is
exercised in good faith, is in the interest of the
public and is without collusion or fraud, and is
not influenced by motives of personal favoritism
or ill will. The foregoing rules are supported by
the great weight of authority. They are founde<l
upon sound reasons."
The Attorney General's letter opinion of September 1, 1967, seemingly reversed a prior opinion from
that office on the same subject which had been outstanding and controlling for a number of years. In a
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letter opinion to the Utah State Building Board dat . . d
.March 3, 1959, the Attorney General construed the
same Section 63-10-7, which intervenor contendt: is
controlling and limits the Building Board to the ministerial act of determining only the lowest bid in the
awarding of contracts. This earlier opinion concluded
as follows:
"On the basis of the wide latitude given by the
courts to the awarding authority and the liberal
interpretation of 'lowest responsible bidder'
statutes adopted by the courts, we conclude that
for the benefit and protection of the public and
when it is to the best interest and advantage of
the state so to do, you may consider time of completion as a factor in determining lowest bidder
in awarding a building contract. The degree to
which you shall consider time as a factor is within
your discretion, said discretion to be exercised in
good faith and not in capricious or arbitrary
manner. "
This well-considered opinion cited pertinent case
and general law which is helpful in our present case.
Page 2 of this opinion stated as follows:
"There has been much litigation as to who is
the 'lowest bidder'. 'Lowest bidder' statutes are
mandatory and where the statute simply says
'lowest bidder' without other words of qualification, the courts have held that such a statute
endows the awarding authorities with only the
ministerial duty of determining who is the
'lowest' bidder, and does not give them any judicial or discretionary authority. (27 A.L.R. 2d
937). However, the courts do allow such authvr-
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ity where the applicable provision contains some
qualifying word, such as 'responsible,' or where
the authority is granted to determine whether an
award to the lowest bidder would be for the best
interest of the people, or where the right is
granted to reject any and all bids, or wh~re, as in
our statute, judgment is reserved as to the responsibility and qualifications of the bidder.
"In these latter situations the low bid is not
necessarily the one lowest in dollars and cents.
The courts have held that the awarding authority
may consider such things as competency, ability,
promptness, skill and business judgment, experience, integrity, and previous conduct. 'The term
"responsible" is not, however, limited to pecuniary ability . . . but pertains to many other
characteristics of the bidder, such as his general
ability and capacity to carry on the work, his
equipment and facilities, his promptness, and the
quality of work previously done by him. . .. '
(State v. Board of Comm. of Nebraska, 181
N:\V. 530, 105 Neb. 570). All matters bearing
upon the likelihood the contract will be promptly
and efficiently performed bear upon the question
of responsibility of bidders and may and should
be considered in determining who is the 'lowest
responsible bidder.' ( 43 Am. J ur., Public Works
and Contracts, Sec. 42, and cases cited).
"In determining who is the 'lowest responsible
bidder' public boards and officials are vested
with wide discretion, and their decision, when
based upon an honest exercise of the discretion
thus vested in them, will not be interfered with
by the courts, even if erroneous. Of course, a
public board or official cannot act arbitrarily,
but an honest determination that a bidder's bid,
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though the lowest, is not the best, will 1Jrdinarily
control. ( 43 Am .•Tur., Public \Vorks and Co,;tract.s, Ste. 44•, and cases cite<l). See also ~Ii:-_;
souri Service Co. v. City of Stanberry, 108 S.\\'.
:;;d, ~5, ~~-H ;;Io. u<J;J.
"Where, either by statute or by the advertisement for bids, the right to reject any or all bids
is resened, an even wider descretion is vested
in the awarding authority. In such a situation
there is no binding obligatic~n to award the contract to any bidder and although all bids are
rejected and new bids asked for, the courts will
seldom, if ever, interfere."
The concluding paragraph above is significant in the
present case for the specifications for the seating contain
an express provision authorizing the owner to reject
any and all bids (Section 2, subsection 5, page IB/l and
2) and the Building Boar,Q has express statutory authority to do this (Section 64-1-5, U.C.A., 1953). For
the discretion implicit in the power to reject all bids,
see 27 A.L.R. 2d 924 where it is stated:
"Where public officials have the right to reject
any and all bids for a public contract, the view
is generally taken that they may consider the
difference or variations in the character or qualitv of the materials, articles, or work proposed
t~ be furnished by the various bidders, in determining whether to accept any of the bids, or
which bid to accept."
Section 63-10-7 was initially passed in 1929, a
number of years prior to the initial passage of 53-38-5 in
1947. The introductory and final paragraphs from this
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earlier section establish that its express prov1s10ns are
not meant to be limitations on the power or authority
of the State Building Board, but merely an expression
of certain powers. While the introductory paragraph
was cited in the intervenor's brief, the final paragraph
of this section was not. It states as follows:
63-10-7.
" ( 19) The foregoing particular enumeration
of powers is intended only for the purpose of
clearly providing certain powers deemed particularly important, and shall not be cons trued as
limiting the powers and authority granted to the
board to those powers particularly enumerated,
nor even to the general classes thereof; Lut it is
expressly declared that the Utah State Building
Board is vested with full power and authority
to do any and all things which in its judgment
may be necessary or proper for carrying out any
of the purposes of this chapter, including the
making of necessary and proper expenditures,
with the approval of the governor, of state
money; provided, that no expenditures shall be
made or authorized in excess of the amount from
time to time appropriated therefor and that all
expenditures shall be made in the manner provided by law upon the order of the board, subject
to approval by the department of finance before
payment is made."

The discretionary power given to the Building
Board in the making of contracts involving "campus
funds" by Section 53-8-5 was provided to insure the
construction of buildings and the purchase and installation of furniture and equipment that the Building
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Board in its wisdom, experience and prudence would
deem to be best suited for the intended use at the particular campus. The same statute also gives certain
controls in the expenditure of the "campus funds" to
the Board of Regents of the particular institution involved. In the present case, there was the coordinated
exercise of the judgments of the University Board of
Regents and the State Building Hoard in favor of the
seating bid by plaintiff for $301,987.98 on the sound
and proper basis that such seating was the best for the
intended purpose and would therefore be the more
prudent use of the "campus funds." The trial court,
under these circumstances, properly concluded that the
Building Board was authorized and empowered to give
the contract to the plaintiff and was not bound to
contract with the intervenor.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND DECIDED THIS DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION AND INTERVENOR HAS NO RIGHT TO PROTEST THE
TRIAL COURT'S CONSIDERING THIS CASE.
It is difficult to understand just what intervenor

is contending for in its Point 2. The heading states:
"THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFF HAD A LEGALLY PROTECTABLE INTEREST AND STANDING IN
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COURT TO PREVENT EXECFTION O.F A
CONTRACT BE'f"\VEEN TlIE STATE BUILDING BOARD AND INTERYENOR."
This indicates that the trial court prevented the
execution of a contract between the Building Board
and intervenor, which is simply not the fact. This was
accomplished by this Supreme Court entering a \V rit
of Prohibition and thus there is no basis for such a
complaint against the trial court. The contention that
plaintiff had no standing to bring this us it for declaratory judgment was previously considered by this court
and rejected when the \V rit of Prohibition was issued.
While the trial court did state in the judgment
that the plaintiff was a corporation, contractor, and
taxpayer of this state, and had proper standing and a
right to maintain this proceeding (R. 38), no contention to the contrary was ever asserted by the defendants in this proceeding which, of course, followed the
issuance of the Writ of Prohibition. It is respect£ ully
submitted that the intervenor, a Texas corporation not
qualified to do business in this state, has only one interest in this proceeding, and that is as a bidder on the
contract in question. As such, the intervenor has no
right to assert a lack of standing by the plaintiff, who
is a Utah corporation, business, and taxpayer, and was
the bidder designated by the contracting agency to
obtain the contract. There is clearly no one with a
greater right and standing to challenge the erroneous
ruling by the Attorney General, the effect of which
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was to deprive the plaintiff of this substantial contract
and the taxpayers an<l citizens of this state of the best
judgment and experience of the State Building Board,
the contracting authority charged to exercise such judgment and experience in the public interest.
Assuming the question of standing had been
properly raised by the defendants who were the parties
to this suit who could assert such an issue, the plaintiff
would still have been determined to have standing to
bring this declaratory judgment action. Intervenor
claims the general rule that the judiciary will not interfere with the administrative actions of the executive
forecloses the plaintiffs from bringing this suit and cites
as authority for such position Schulte v. Salt Lake City,
supra, and Clayton v. Salt Lake City, supra. This rule,
and these cases, are readily distinguishable and provide
no support for intervenor's contention. In fact, they are
in direct conflict because in these cases an unsuccessful
bidder was permitted to sue, but the courts, while
accepting the suit, ruled that they would not interfere
with the administrative discretion that was exercised in
making the award to another bidder. Here we do not
have a suit by an unsuccessful bidder, but rather by a
successful bidder who was prevented from obtaining the
contract by an erroneous construction by the Attorney
General of certain statutes involving the bidding of
state contracts. The plaintiff in this case, therefore, was
a taxpayer with a substantial pecuniary interest and
an advesary position, and thus had what the court
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found to be lacking in the plaintiff in Lyon v. Bateman.
119 Utah 434, 228 P. 2d 818, relied on by the intervenor.
Occasionally cases have indicated an unsuccessful
bidder has no standing to question the granting of a
bid to another bidder because the letting of the contract
is for the benefit of the public and the bidder has no
vested right in the contract. 80 A.L.R. 1382, 1392; 43
C.J.S. Injunction, § 120. 55 C.J.S. Mandamus, § 166.
These cases are distinguishable from the present case
where plaintiff Was the successful bidder in the determination of the contracting authority. Even these cases,
however, upon close examination, reveal that there has
been no careful distinction made between the right of
the unsuccessful bidder to raise the issue of compliance
with the statute and the inability or reluctance of the
court to grant relief to the unsuccessful bidder by compelling a contracting authority, with discretion, to
award the contract to him.
The sound argument can be made that even an
unsuccessful bidder should be allowed to sue to protect
the public's interest in assuring compliance with the
statute, even though the court will not award the contract to the complaining bidder where the contracting
authorities can exercise discretion. The unsuccessful
bidder will still have an incentive to prevent the improper awarding of the contract. A taxpayer with such
public spirit may not be found. Consequently a number
of courts, particularly in the more recent years, have
allowed the unsuccessful bidder to bring such a suit.
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Brown v. City of Phoenix, 77 Ariz. 368, 272 P. 2d 358
( 1954) ; Staie ex. rel. Werner v. District Court of ~Pirst
Judicial District, 142 lVIont. 145, 382 P. 2d 824 (1963);
Johnson v. Craddock, 228 Ore. 308, 365 P. 2d 89
( 1961) ; Angelo J. lJ;Jartone ~ Son Inc. v. County of
Nassau, 42 .Misc. 2d 804, 249 N.Y.S. 353 (1964); D_ictaphone Corp. v. O'Leary, 287 N.W. 491, 41 N.E. 2d
68 (1942); State ex. rel. Democrat Printing Co. v.
Schmiege, 18 \Vis. 2d 325, 118 N.,V. 2d 845 (1963).
While Utah apparently has not directly ruled on
the right of an unsuccessful bidder to raise the issue of
compliance with a statute or controlling law, it seems
clear that this court has held that a taxpayer may bring
such a suit. The Clayton and Schulte cases, supra, are
directly in point in support of this rule, and the rule
appears to have been generally followed in similar cases
from other jurisdictions. See J. C. Lewis Motor Co.
Inc. v. Mayor, etc., of City of Savannah, 210 Ga. 591,
82 S.E. 2d 132 (1954); Application of Air Terminal
Services, Inc., 47 Hawaii 499, 393 P. 2d 60 (1964);
Hannan v. Board of Education, 25 Okla. 372, 107 P.
646 (1909); Leskinen v. Pucelj, 262 l\'Iinn. 461, 115
N.vV. 2d 346 (1962); Duffy v. Village of Princeton,
240 Minn. 9, 60 N.W. 2d 27 (19.53); Day v. Beatrice,
169 N eh. 858, 101 N.W. 2d 481 (1960).
For several recent cases in which this court upheld
the right of a taxpayer to challenge the validity of
proposed governmental action or the legality of a legislative enactment, see Rich v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah
').7

2d 339, 437 P. 2d 690, and Carter v. Beaver County
Service Area, No. l, llG Utah 2d 280, 399 P. 2d 440.

In this case plaintiff was the successful bidder, but
even if the plaintiff was determined to be the unsuccessful bidder, it was also a taxpayer able to show a substantial injury, and therefore entitled to bring this suit
for declaratory judgment. State v. Mitchell, 105
Mont. 326, 74 P. 2d 417 ( 1937); Beasley v. Dailey,
222 Ark. 339, 260 S.,V.2d 442 (1953) ;Ha:nnan v. Board
of Education, supra; Times Puh. Co. v. City of Everett,
9 Wash. 518, 37 P. 69.5 ( 1894). The trial court therefore properly concluded that the plaintiff had the
proper standing and right to maintain this proceeding.

CONCLUSION
The law controlling the facts and circumstances
of this case authorizes and supports the declaratory
judgment of the lower court and therefore this court
should affirm.
Respect£ ully submitted,
DAVID K. WATKISS,
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES,
RAMPTON & 'VATKISS
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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